This paper provides empirical evidence of the heterogeneous borrowing behaviours of French regions, despite a common accountability constraint that forces them to balance their budget and to borrow only to finance investment expenditure (golden rule). To this end, we use a quantile regression analysis covering the period from 1999 to 2007. The heterogeneity is very pronounced when the regions face a negative shock on debt, for instance a tightening of financial conditions. We explain our findings as a consequence of the fact that the Golden rule can be thought of as a "soft" rule if some local administrations believe that a financial rescue from the central government is automatic (as the regions receive transfers from the later). In this case, some regions find it advantageous to consider borrowing as an adjustment variable when taking their budgetary decisions. 
Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis has revived debates, in France, on the fiscal problems facing local governments. Up until then, many theoretical and empirical papers on local finance widely focused on local governments' financial autonomy in the context of political decentralization.
For instance, questions related to the fiscal room for manoeuvre have given rise to articles examining the problem of tax autonomy (Blöchlinger and King (2006) , Gilbert and Guengant (2001) , Meloche et al. (2004) ) or tax competition (Buettner (2003) , Devereux et al. (2007) , Maties and Rocaboy (2005) , Mintz and Smart (2004) , Wilson (1999) ). Very few studies were devoted to the question of local investment (one exception is Hoorens (2001 Hoorens ( , 2006 ).
However, given the crisis juncture, the question of the capacity of local governments to boost public investment in order to support demand has become crucial. In France, the main measures of the stimulus package adopted at the end of 2008 concerned a boost to local investment (transport infrastructures, roads, railways, investment in hospitals, etc). Since local governments account for three quarter of public investment, one can legitimately wonder whether the current crisis will hinder the capacity of regions to implement recovery plans.
Contrary to the central State, the French local governments have an obligation by the law to vote their budget in balance according to a so-called Golden rule. The latter stipulates that each section of the local budget (current and investment spending) must be balanced and that borrowing can exclusively be used to finance investment expenditure. Amongst revenues devoted to financing investment (allocations granted by the State budget, local tax, receipts in excess of current expenditures) borrowing appears then to be used as an adjustment variable.
Hence, at least intuitively, the Golden rule should normalize borrowing behaviours.
Nevertheless, this paper provides empirical evidence of the heterogeneous borrowing behaviours of the French regions, despite the Golden rule. To this end, we use a quantile regression analysis covering the period from 1999 to 2007. The heterogeneity is very pronounced when the regions face a negative shock on debt, for instance a tightening of financial conditions. We explain our findings as a consequence of the fact that the Golden rule can be thought of as a "soft" rule if some local administrations believe that a fiscal rescue from the central government is automatic (as the regions receive transfers from the later). In this case, some regions find it advantageous to consider borrowing as an adjustment variable when taking their budgetary decisions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the accountability framework in which the regions' budgetary decisions are undertaken. Section 3 contains our empirical analysis and Section 4 briefly discusses our main findings. Finally Section 5 concludes.
Local public expenditure and borrowing accountability framework
In France, local administrations account for almost three quarter of the total of public investment (approximately 2.4% GDP out of 3.2% of GDP in 2009). The regional administrative level has been created in March 1982 March , and reinforced in 2003 March /2004 , within the context of political decentralization. The main competences that were transferred to Regions concerned economic, urban and county planning (for instance, public transportation regional schemes) education and professional training (high and secondary school, investment).
Decentralization has entailed a major issue regarding the fiscal autonomy of local government. The rules governing local governments differ from those of the central government. When voted, local budgets have to be balanced and they must satisfy a Golden Rule. Local governments' accountability in France distinguishes between current expenditure and investment expenditure. Contrary to the central State budget, the Golden Rule imposes that each "section" (current and investment) of the budget has to be balanced and that borrowing has to be used for balancing the investment section. Thus, for a given level of investment and a given level of grants from the State budget, the need to balance the investment section forces local administrations to use their self-financing (e.g. current receipts in excess of current expenditure) or to borrow. Table 1 shows the accountability framework for regional governments. Borrowing is exclusively aimed at financing investment 4 (equipment expenditure and purchase of durable goods). Financial costs, including interest payments, are considered as current expenditure (this assignment is a requirement from the Golden Rule which aims at achieving a good intertemporal management: the burden of the loan which defers the cost of funding on future generations must be covered by current resources). Another function of borrowing is to act as an adjustment variable depending upon the rooms for manoeuvre of local governments. The latter depend upon two factors: the amount of transfers from the State budget and local tax revenues. The amount of indebtedness depends on the existing stock of debt and its related mortgage. 7 These grants include compensation for wage part of the local tax, compensation for the regional part of the residence tax, compensation for capital taxes, 95% of the decentralization allocation and a perequation allocation.
Table1. Accountability framework of French regional governments
revenues come from direct taxes such as housing tax, built and non-built property taxes, local business tax and from tax sharing with the State like for instance oil tax (TIPP).
We accordingly have the following identities Figure 5 shows the evolution of several rates:
− the OAT constant rate at 10 years (denoted TEC10) which corresponds to the usual estimate of long-term debt conditions;
− the 12 month Euribor which is an average rate charged by a set of credit institutions in the euro area and which corresponds to an assessment of the usual conditions for short term debt;
− the 3 month Euribor which corresponds to the usual estimate of short-term debt conditions;
− the EONIA, which corresponds to short-term debt conditions too.
All those rates are expressed in real terms and follow very similar patterns. 
Evidence of heterogeneous borrowing behaviours
In this section, we focus on the borrowing decisions and show that they are heterogeneous across regions. To this end, we do a quantile regression analysis over the period 1999-2007.
We use a pooled panel data of 176 observations (eight years and 22 regions). The application of quantile regression techniques enables to introduce parameter heterogeneity across the conditional distribution of borrowing and see whether the influence of the explanatory variables on borrowing differ across regions.
We consider a specification in which the explanatory variable is the first-difference of the logarithm of borrowing (DLBOR t ) and the explanatory variables are the following: firstdifferences of the logarithm of investment expenditure (DLINV t ) and self-financing capacity (DLSFC t ), the logarithm of past debt level ( ), the interest rate (RATE t ) and the first lag of the endogenous variable ( ). Transfers from the central government are not included in the regression in order to avoid colinearity biases. Indeed, investment allocations from central government are strongly linked with regional investment expenditure.
The estimated equation is as follows: ,...,8 and k=1,...,22 (3) It is derived from an error correction mechanism in which the long-run relationship is the constraint imposed by the accounting framework. Specifically, the ECM equation is written as
where TRANSF are the transfer from central government. The accountability framework implies that 1, 1 and the term between brackets reduces to zero. In the equation, we also assume that ω=0 in order to avoid the colinearity problems mentioned above.
We are thus interested in estimating Equation (3) to see whether there are differences in the response of borrowing behaviours to changes in the explanatory variables. The application of quantile regression techniques allows possible parameter heterogeneity across the conditional distribution of borrowing.
Quantile regression principle
For purpose of clarity, we briefly explain some key features of quantile regression analysis.
For technical presentations, we refer the reader to Koenker and Basset (1978) , Buchinsky Siddiqui difference coefficients and kernel density (see Koenker and Bassett (1982) , and Koenker (1994)). It can be shown that the quantile estimator is distributed asymptotically as a Gaussian variable :
To deal with the endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables, we adopt a two-step approach, by first using instruments to forecast the investment variable (using its lagged values and those of the regional GDP) and then by substituting the resulting forecasted investment variable for the original one in Equation(3). Further, due to the small sample data, the standard errors of the estimated coefficient are bootstrapped. For purpose of robustness, we use three bootstrap methods (residual bootstrap, Markov chain Marginal bootstrap and XY-pair bootstrap) 9 . For each method, we do 100 replications. Table 2 reports the estimates for the 25th quantile of borrowing distribution representing regions with low conditional borrowing levels, the 75th quantile describing those with high conditional borrowing levels and the 50 th quantile (median). The results are shown for the case in which the interest rate series is TEC10 (the other interest rates yield similar results).
Empirical results
Borrowing behaviour is sensitive to the financial situation facing the regions. We see that it is negatively and significantly related to debt level and past borrowings. However, interest rates, investment expenditure, GDP and self-financing capacity do not seem to be determinant explanatory factors. The impacts of indebtedness and past debt level on borrowing are significantly different between low-borrowing and high-borrowing regions, as shown in We further find that the position in the distribution of a specific region varies importantly in the panel (see figure 7) , thereby suggesting that in addition to being heterogeneous borrowing behaviours also vary across time.
To study the consequences of the heterogeneous response of borrowing to the debt level, we examine how the borrowing distribution changes when all regions in the sample are hit by the same shock. We compare the probability density function for borrowing using the original data and the distribution of the forecasted level of borrowing that emerges when the debt variable is increased or decreased by its standard error. We consider an exogenous shock that can be either positive or negative. We proceed as follows. We first compute the conditional probability density function for borrowing, using the estimated coefficients of (3) for different quantiles from the 10th up to the 90th. Then, the obtained distribution is "shocked" by one standard error of the debt variable. We consider both positive and negative shocks. . We see that reveals that a positive debt shock is associated with a reduction in the average behaviour and a more pronounced dispersion of the borrowing distribution. Indeed, the dotted lines are slightly less leptokurtic than the solid lines. In contrast, a negative shock induces an increase in the average behaviour and a stronger dispersion of the distribution. An interesting point is that the reaction to a same shock is not symmetric. The rise of borrowing consecutive to a reduction of the debt level is more pronounced compared to the diminution of borrowing consecutive to a positive shock on debt.
The response to a negative shock is quite intuitive. When financial conditions are loosening, regions can implement different investment programs which can explain the observed rise in heterogeneity symbolized by the more platikurtic dotted lines. However, the fact that a positive shock on debt levels leads to a rise in the conditional distribution heterogeneity is much more puzzling. Indeed, at least intuitively, such a shock should make the constraint become more binding and hence should lead to uniform borrowing behaviors in order to meet the Golden Rule. But, it seems that the opposite is at play. In the next section, we propose an explanation to this puzzle by considering different ways in which regions deal with the Golden rule. 
How do regions deal with the Golden rule?
To answer this question one must have in mind that there are several interpretations of "a rule".
Some rules do not have binding effects (the so-called "soft laws" in the literature 10 ), while other are very stringent ("hard laws"). The opposition between soft and hard law refers to the debates on the benefits of flexibility against certainty. This opposition is at the heart of a lot of works in the field of law and economics. The main benefits of legal certainty are traditionally justified by arguments that are in line with the findings of the neo-institutionalist school and developments of the theory of incomplete contracts. The implementation of secure and easily predictable systems encourages economic performance and long-term investments (Acemoglu et al. (2001 (Acemoglu et al. ( , 2002 , North and Weingast (1989) , Rodrik and Subramian (2003) ). Other works emphasize the benefits of flexibility since it enables economic agents to adapt themselves more quickly to a rapidly changing world (Berglof and Rosenthal (2003), Deffains and Guigou (2002) , Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005) , La Porta et al. (1997) , Roe (2003) ).
In public finance, several factors leading the local authorities to interpret a rule as a soft rule have been identified.
The first factor is the size of local government. Wildasin (1997) The validation of the "too big to fail" argument therefore depends on the modelling framework used.
Another factor yielding local authorities to favour soft budget constraints is the possible conflicts caused by the management of the tax base. Goodspeed (2002) stresses that transfers from the federal level to the regional level generally involve a "common property problem", since the increasing federal tax rate levied to finance the bail-out reduces the opportunity behaviour of the regional government by increasing cost of borrowing. Developing this line of arguments, Breuillé et al. (2007) show that the structure of the tax system has a significant influence on the degree of "softness" of the budget constraint for local governments.
A third factor is the opportunistic behaviour of local governments which seek additional transfers from the federal government (such a behaviour is reinforced if the federal government accepts to make these transfers ex post). In Europe many examples of such failures have been identified. For example, in the early 1990s, the poorest regions of southern
Italy have experienced very large deficits in their health care system and have asked for the federal government assistance through transfers (Von Hagen et al. (2000) ). In Sweden, the central government has had to assist municipalities in financial distress during the period 1974 -1992 (Dalhberg-Lidbom and Petterson ( 2003 ). In 1992, the German region of Bremen and Saarland were refunded by the federal government because they were unable to cope with excessive debt and the increase in the share of interest expenses in their budget (Rodden, 2003) .
Thus the question of the automaticity of a financial rescue from the central government is central to understand why some French regions do not interpret the Golden rule as a hard rule and why, heterogeneous borrowing behaviours can be observed when regions face a positive debt shock (for instance a deterioration of the financing conditions as was the case during the 2008 financial crisis). In other words, we propose to explain the observed heterogeneity in borrowing behaviours by discussing the links between the golden rule and the soft budget constraint. We can assume that regions aim at producing an optimal public investment level.
Their problem is therefore to obtain a proper financing to invest. The way they make their decisions can be summarized by the following four situations (see Table 3 ).
• If the financing conditions are easy, the Golden rule is not binding because regions have no difficulty to abide by the rule thanks to borrowing. One can then consider two hypothetical cases to deal with our problem. Such developments never occurred at the regional level so far but there are some examples at the municipality level in France (bankruptcy of the city of Angoulême).
− 2/ The second one is a case where regions consider that the central government will not intervene (soft law status of the soft budget constraint). Then, the only way to avoid bankruptcy is to find other revenues. For instance, the city of Berlin in Germany had to get rid of some of its lands to achieve it.
• If the financing conditions are tightening, two different cases can occur.
− 3/ If the local administrations believe that central government's financial rescue is automatic, then the Golden Rule will no longer be binding. This scenario could describe a too big to fail behaviour.
11 For more information about the procedures see Bouvier, 2008. − 4/ If, conversely, the local administrations believe that central government intervention may not take place, then they are unable to achieve the required level of investment. The Golden Rule is binding and becomes the adjustment variable to balance the budget is investment that must be reduced compared to the optimal level.
To summarize, if the soft budget constraint is interpreted as a hard law (the central government financial rescue is automatic), then regions should not encounter obstacles to increase their investment. However, these investments involve a higher risk of default 12 .
Thus, if rescue plan investments can benefit from being achieved at local level (principle of subsidiarity, minimization of transaction costs), financial transfers to the local level can hide problems related to public debt sustainability. In the case of a "hard" budget constraint, the risk of default depends ultimately on the central state which may decide not to transfer the implementation of rescue plans at the local level without counterparts.
If the budget constraint is a soft law (the central government financial rescue is not automatic), then the risk is that the regions be unable to finance investment and thus do not implement it because of insufficient funds.
Hence, the latter case could explain why such heterogeneity is observed. If Regions consider that a financial rescue from the central government, through a raise of transfers for instance, is automatic in case of financial difficulties, then the Golden rule is no longer economically constraining. At present time, in order to face the commitments taken in the recovery plans, French local governments have raised local taxation by 6% on average. If this rise of local taxation will prove in the end to be insufficient to cover the new expenditures then we could face the situation that we have just discussed. What we predict is that the heterogeneity of local borrowing behaviours will increase.
12 It should be noted that the golden rule does not ensure compliance with the Maastricht criteria. Indeed, at least theoretically, the local governments can issue debt infinitely as long as they find appropriate financing. The Golden Rule only requires investment section to be balanced. Regions can issue debt which represents more than 60 % of regional GDP.
In practice, regions indebtedness amounts for 65% of current revenue in 2007. 
Conclusion
The French stimulus package adopted at the end of 2008 yielded French regions to boost local public investment. If the crisis results in a tightening of financial conditions, the capacity of regions to meet their commitments could be jeopardized.
To deal with this issue, we first conduct a quantile regression analysis that reveals that the impact of indebtedness on borrowing is steeper for the high-borrowing regions. Consequently, though all regions adopt a debt management policy to contain debt growth, they exhibit heterogeneous behaviours that reflect differences in terms of investment policies and more generally in terms of supply of public goods.
We consider how a shock on the debt level may alter the conditional distribution of borrowing in regions. We found that both a positive and a negative shock lead to increase this heterogeneity. While the latter is rather intuitive, the former is quite puzzling. Indeed, the socalled Golden rule, by requiring budget to be voted on balance, should lead to an uniformization of borrowing behaviour.
We propose an explanation to this phenomenon by linking the Golden rule framework to the law and economics debate between hard law and soft law. Our analysis suggests that, up to now, the Golden rule has not constituted an economic constraint. With a tightening of financing condition, this situation could change and French regions could be confronted to a trade-off between investment reduction and non-compliance with the Golden rule. The latter could be detrimental to the implementation of the French recovery plan, the former to local public finance sustainability.
